The québécois national mythology is dependent on oral culture for sustenance. This orality, while allowing a popular transmission of central concepts, also leaves the foundations of a national francophone culture exposed to influence by the anglophone forces that dominate world popular culture. A primary example is song, which has been linked to a nationalist impulse in Quebec for over thirty years. What remains of that linkage today? Economic, cultural, political and linguistic pressures have made the role of song as an ethnic and national unifier increasingly ambiguous, and reflect uncertainties about the Quebec national project itself, as the Quebec economy becomes reflective of global trends toward supranational control.

A discussion of nationalism must be based on a shared understanding of the term. Anthony Smith distinguishes between territorial and ethnic definitions: territorially defined nations can point to a specific territory and rule by law; ethnies, on the other hand, add a collective name, a myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive culture and a sense of solidarity to the territorial foundation. If any element among these is missing, it must be invented. This “invention” should not be seen as a negative or devious attempt to distort the present or the past; it is part of the necessary constitution of a “story” which can become the foundation for a national myth-structure. As Smith notes: "What matters [...] is not the authenticity of the historical record, much less any attempt at 'objective' methods of historicizing, but the poetic, didactic and integrative purposes which that record is felt to disclose" (25). It is in this context that apparently arbitrary aspects of Quebec nationalism
must be viewed—as willful and necessary attempts to assemble the essential elements of nationality.

The choice of Quebec as a collective name and territorial definition of francophone Canada, for example, denies equal recognition to francophones living in Ontario, Manitoba and New Brunswick, while at the same time diminishing the rights of indigenous peoples and anglophones living within Quebec borders. Similarly, a shared culture and history which assume a Catholic francophone dimension would exclude indigenous peoples, anglophones, Protestants and Jews, as well as recent immigrants of diverse origin, from a sense of solidarity. There is little doubt that ethnic solidarity has an underside of intolerance. Smith cites the cultural levelling (to the detriment of cultural and linguistic minorities) which occurred after the French Revolution;¹ we need look no further than the American "melting pot," which has recently taken on connotations of discrimination and elimination of cultural and linguistic difference among immigrant and minority communities in favor of the anglophone majority.² Pierre Elliot Trudeau, as early as 1971, described a change in cultural self-definition of Canada which was perceived in Quebec as being hostile to their national project: “...le terme biculturalisme ne dépeint pas comme il faut notre société; le mot multiculturalisme est plus précis à cet égard” (McRoberts 6). The Québécois could not embrace the rhetoric of multiculturalism with first establishing francophone dominance within provincial borders, a task which remained to be done at the time of Trudeau’s statement.

One could say that the seeds of the nationalist dream in Quebec were planted in 1760, when la Nouvelle France ceased to exist and its francophone inhabitants became second-class subjects of King George III of England. The essential points of conflict have evolved from
that time, yet maintain a remarkable constancy. British religious intolerance took the form of
the Test Act, which effectively kept Catholics out of the colonial administration by requiring
a denial of the Pope’s authority as a precondition of employment by the British Crown.
English would thus become by default the language of power, though French was not
specifically excluded from official use until 1841, and then only momentarily. The 17th
century class structure exemplified by anglophone colonial administrators and merchants with
political and economic dominance over francophone trappers and subsistence farmers retained
its essential nature for almost two centuries, with appropriate modifications due to economic
evolution. Lord Durham described, in 1838, a situation which had not changed substantially
by the mid-20th century:

“...it would appear that the great mass of French Canadians are
doomed, in some measure, to occupy an inferior position, and to be
dependent on the English for employment. The evils of poverty and
dependence would merely be aggravated in a ten-fold degree, by a spirit of
jealous and resentful nationality which should separate the working class
of the community from the possessors of wealth and employers of labor...”
(Milner and Milner ix).

Durham wrote his report after the armed rebellion of the patriotes in 1838, the most
violent response to English Canadian dominance. French Canadians have accumulated a
litany of misfortunes in this relationship, from the deportation of Acadians in 1755 to the
emigration of as many as 500,000 French Canadians in the late 19th century when
economic hardship was disproportionately visited on the francophone population
(Hamelin 396).

This Anglo/French opposition represents a necessary myth—part of the foundation
of contemporary Quebec nationalism—but the historical reality on which it is based is
more complex. From the mid 19th to the mid-20th century there was substantial collaboration between anglophone and Catholic francophone elites, based on continued English management of the economy and Church control in social and cultural domains.\(^3\)

Through much of this period, Montreal was the center of the Canadian economy, due in part to the acceptance by all parties of the leadership role of British descendants in the direction of business and industry.

The Church’s eventual promotion of a rural, largely nostalgic nationalism hindered the growth of a modern nationalism until 1960, and in fact helped to maintain English primacy in commerce and industry. Jesuits published *L’Action française* in the 1920s (revived as *L’Action Nationale* in 1932), in which they deplored English and American dominance, the presence of Jews in the province, and suggested that Mussolini’s policies would be appropriate in a separate French-Canadian State (Milner and Milner 113).\(^4\)

Arnopoulos and Clift describe the clergy’s mid-century outlook as nearly a global refusal of the 20th century: “Nationalist elements and the clergy were allied in condemning industrial society, the dangers of the large city, the depredations of big business, and the immoral nature of modernity in all its guises” (33). It took the cumulative effects of the Depression, a decline in religious practice, and the rise of trade unionism to break the hold of the Church over French-Canadian society and open up the possibilities of a progressive francophone nationalism which would be truly threatening to the English position. The symbolic signal of this change was the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, which followed the death of Maurice Duplessis and modernized the provincial state apparatus, and especially the nationalizing of private power companies under the aegis of
Hydro-Québec in 1962. This was the first clear infringement of the tradition of anglophone economic rule in Quebec.

During the 1960s, Church influence virtually disappeared. Sean McCutcheon goes so far as to claim that Hydro-Québec assumed Church societal functions: “Hydro-Québec partly substituted for the Church [...] respect for Hydro-Québec’s mastery and authority provide some of the social cohesion once provided by respect for the Church” (19). While this may seem extreme, the subsequent massive importance of Hydro-Québec in the provincial economy is difficult to overstate.

The trigger for this movement toward francophone control of the economy can be found in studies which revealed, for example, that of fourteen ethnic groups resident in the province, the francophones were twelfth in economic standing, followed only by the Italians (who had often learned French) and the Native Peoples. Bilingualism was also seen to correlate negatively with wage level; even a bilingual person of English descent would earn less than a monolingual English person (Milner and Milner 55). Statistical proof that francophones (other than those completely assimilated to English norms) were absent from corporate management led to an explicit understanding of what most French already knew: “The choice for the French Canadians has been to assimilate or to be poor. Refusing the first choice, they built a society around submission to the latter” (Milner and Milner 64). The modern nationalist movement refused these two choices in favor of a third, that of demanding that the sites of provincial social and commercial power become francophone.
The Québécois thus began a campaign to change public and private institutions through a series of laws establishing the primacy of the French language. The drama was primarily played out in the schools (where access to English-language education was restricted) and in the business arena, where the language of business and advertising became French by law. The watershed 1968 decision by the town of Saint-Léonard to require French-language schooling for all, for example, was brought about by the realization among francophone nationalists that immigrants were by and large choosing English-language schools as the door to economic opportunity. Worse yet, francophones themselves were beginning to subscribe to this logic and enrolling their children in bilingual or English-language schools (Levine 68). As this example illustrates, linguistic nationalism drew strength from a desire to define a francophone cultural identity, but also from fear of the degradation of that identity through negative transfer statistics among the increasing waves of non-francophone immigrants.

The controversy arising from these laws is perhaps the most internationally visible aspect of Quebec nationalism, and accentuated the schism between anglophones and francophones, and francophones and immigrants. Language legislation was one reason for the economic decline of Montreal, but as Arnopoulous and Clift point out, this decline began as early as the First World War in reaction to the economic configuration of North America and the growth of Toronto (189). In any case, the decline was accelerated in the 1960s as English multinationals moved their corporate headquarters elsewhere (especially Toronto), in many cases leaving behind a francophone subsidiary with strictly provincial responsibilities. The arrival of an separatist government in 1976 did nothing to change
this tendency: one hundred thousand anglophones have left Quebec since that date (Ignatieff 171).

The perception that the locus of power is elsewhere is hardly unique to Quebec in Canada, however, given the national tendency to semi-colonial status within both British and American spheres. The irony is that even separatist designs to nationalize (on the Hydro-Québec model) cannot avoid the basic reality that “...to make its public corporations go, the PQ will have to make its own appeal to the banks, trusts and financiers of Wall Street” (Milner and Milner 213).

If language was used to attack economic inequities directly, song had already constituted a remarkable force for the construction of a national identity. During *l’âge d’or de la chanson québécoise*, lasting roughly from 1968 until 1977, affirmations like that of Bruno Roy were not considered hyperbole: “...la chanson québécoise est une manifestation populaire de la conscience collective. Elle est l’affirmation moderne de plus en plus précise de son unité” (9). During the period of nationalist euphoria leading to the election of the *Parti Québécois* in 1976, until the defeat of the referendum on sovereignty-association in 1980, Quebec song was present in massive festival settings in Quebec, was enormously popular in France and conquered a large portion of the provincial market for record sales. From a 10% market share in 1970, Quebec song ballooned to a 25% market share during the Seventies, only to return to 10% at the end of the decade (Aubé 58). By 1985, optimism was a distant memory: “...un constat brutal: la musique et la chanson québécoises—dont on vantait hier la vitalité—sont en voie de marginalisation ” (Alix 58).
Music in Quebec had been effectively colonized until the 1950s, both on the radio and in the cabarets, alternating between French and American influences. In the thirties, a Catholic priest—Charles-Emile Gadbois—published *La Bonne Chanson*, a collection of songs for school use, in a well-meaning attempt to counter American influence. *Le western*, as American-derived country and country-western music was called in Quebec, became popular with French-language versions of American hits. The technique of issuing local versions of songs consecrated in other markets dominated record production in the province. The record companies were indifferent to songs of local origin: “R.C.A. Victor, déclare [Ferdinand] Robidoux, refusait obstinément les chansons québécoises que je lui proposais. Tout ce qui venait de chez nous, par nous, pour nous, cela n’avait aucune espèce d’importance” (Roy 45).

When French cabaret singers, including Charles Aznavour and Gilbert Bécaud, began to have success in Montreal at clubs like the *Faisan doré* and the *Saint-Germain-des-Prés*, it signaled an opening for francophone *chansonniers* from Quebec. The success of Félix LeClerc and others in Paris lead to the opening of the first *boîtes à chanson* in Montreal, notably *Chez Bozo* in 1958, which was quickly followed by dozens of others. The *chansonnier* and *québecitude* were not born together by chance. An entire intellectual, artistic and political movement was developing around the concept of a nationalism based on the provincial borders of Quebec, and the French language. This movement was starved for the cultural identity Smith names as essential to its existence, an identity which would update the picturesque rural traditions of the *habitant*, and provide a window towards a culture with a future. Jean-Paul Ladouceur noted the lack of a
Québécois identity, after a watershed strike at Radio-Canada in 1958: “On constata que la conscience québécoise n’existait pas, que la préoccupation de produire des choses québécoises, dans la chanson ou ailleurs, n’existait pas non plus” (L’Herbier 98).

Into this breech stepped the chansonniers, the best-known of the first wave being Gilles Vigneault, Félix LeClerc, Jean-Pierre Ferland, Raymond Lévesque and Claude Léveillé. LeClerc was especially important, having conquered Paris without compromise, in his flannel shirts, singing his straightforward songs about Quebec. All of Leclerc’s songs seemed to be specifically québécois, but many also had explicit political content, like “L’Alouette en colère” or “L’encan,” the latter attacking the sale of Quebec natural and cultural assets to the Americans:

Approchez, Messieurs-Dames!
une belle petite rivière à saumon à vendre pas cher
elle a de beaux petits saumons qui viennent frayer ici depuis des siècles
à vendre avec des îles, du bois, des chuttes/
[...]
I’ll take it!

Songs like Gilles Vigneault’s “Mon pays” and George Dor’s “St. Germain” extoll the virtues of the traditions and landscape of Quebec. “Mon pays” became a virtual anthem, with its implied evocation of a patrie, not just a regional origin. The themes of this first wave occasionally recalled those of the conservative rural utopian nationalism which predated the Quiet Revolution, but the nationalist movement of the 1960s found in these songs a perfect match nonetheless. As Aubé explains: “Il y a] deux grands facteurs de ressourcement et de renouveau: les boîtes à chanson et les chansonniers. La rencontre de
The first wave of *chansonniers* also owed much to France. They resembled Brassens, Brel and Léo Ferré more than the burgeoning folk and rock movements south of the border. Success in France for Vigneault suggested that of Brel, and Robert Charlebois continued that pattern. Charlebois, however, went to California, and came back imbued with the freedom and innovation of the American 1960s. His “Osstidcho” (*Hostie de Show*) concerts, beginning in 1968, integrated influences as diverse as James Brown and psychedelia, and caused a sensation: “C’était plus que juste la chanson ou juste un show; ça s’inscrivait socialement dans un éveil, dans une contestation totale...” (Yves Deschamps, “Pour une chanson” no. 3). Charlebois also legitimized the influences of the American music industry for *chansonniers*, who subsequently occupied the place of a pop avant-garde in the francophone world until the French, with performers like Jacques Higelin, Francis Cabrel, and Bernard Lavilliers, finally caught up. Luc Plamandon, a song-writer, explained the québécois advantage in these terms (apparently without irony): “On est comme dix ans en avance sur eux [les Français] pour l’américanisation du français” (“Pour une chanson” no. 6).

The *chansonniers* would eventually lose the battle against the influences of the anglophone tide of rock music, the initial French version of which was called yé-yé in Quebec. Their decline was in part generational, as Aubé points out: “...de 1965 à 1970, les chansonniers ne sont déjà plus des jeunes” (53). There were still several events to come, which stand out in the cultural history of Quebec. One was the 1974 performance of
Raymond Lévesque’s “Quand les hommes vivront d’amour” by ‘Le Lion, le Loup et le Renard’ (Leclerc, Vigneault and Charlebois) at Superfrancofête in front of 125,000 people. Nationalist euphoria had no difficulty equating independence with the ideal future evoked by Lévesque’s lyrics, and the sacrifice of the soldiers with that of nationalist militants: “Quand les hommes vivront d’amour, / Il n’y aura plus de misère/ Et commenceront les beaux jours/Mais nous nous serons morts, mon frère.” A similar cathartic occasion was Ginette Reno singing Ferland’s “Un peu plus loin” for 300,000 at Le Jour de la montagne in 1975: “Un peu plus haut, un peu plus loin / Je veux aller un peu plus loin / Je veux voir comment c'est là-haut / Garde mon bras, tiens ma main.” These were the high points of chanson/ nationalist identification, and also the beginning of the end. Already a new generation of artists were arriving, Harmonium, Beau Dommage, les Séguins. Michel Rivard, the leader of Beau Dommage, described himself as having been “élevé à l’école des Beatles avec un coup d’œil à Gilles Vigneault ” (“Pour une chanson” no. 4).

The oppositional militancy which had characterized la chanson disappeared with the electoral success of the Parti québécois in 1976. The final straw, however, was the defeat of the 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association by a wide margin. Aubé puts it succinctly: “La chanson...a très mal encaissée le résultat du 20 mai 1980” (80). The result made it impossible to continue to believe in Roy’s formula, cited above, that “la chanson québécoise est une manifestation populaire de la conscience collective.” The Non vote exposed a substantial rift between popular will and the nationalist artistic and intellectual elite. Militancy in artistic circles has not again reached the levels of the mid-1970s, even in the campaign preceding the most recent referendum—in 1995—which again resulted in
defeat for the nationalists, albeit by the thinnest of margins. The fact that the separatist agenda had become governmental with the electoral successes of the Parti québécois was certainly the key element in the drop in militancy in artistic circles: oppositional ideals are easier to celebrate in song than the pragmatic quotidian compromises of governance.

Militancy is not, however, a necessary component of cultural practice with national intentions. A stronger argument can be made for the necessity of that practice to reflect, borrowing Smith’s terms, a shared history and a distinctive culture. The question for song in Quebec is whether such a practice can effectively survive in the cultural and economic space that is contemporary Quebec, with or without political independence. In many ways the aims are the same for both economic and cultural nationalism: the acquisition of local control, to allow decisions with ethnic self-interest as a primary criterion. The need to advance the lot of francophone Quebec workers, whether it be in the power or the music industry, is a constant. Recent occurrences in either industry are not encouraging.

Hydro-Québec is the oft-cited example of Quebec independent initiative in the economic sphere. As we have already mentioned, however, one dark side of harnessing the frozen north to create an exportable power commodity is an indebtedness to American capital which threatens to submerge its potential benefit. Another dark side is an effect on minority peoples which sounds hauntingly like what the Québécois fear for themselves. Sean McCutcheon records his impressions of the James Bay Project’s impact on the area’s Cree Indians: “You do not have to have your land flooded or stolen to be dispossessed of your identity, and many native communities in North America, like
Chisabi, are slowly imploding, a symptom, some say, of the loss of cultural identity” (127).

By the early 1980s, it was clear that the Quebec music industry was in trouble. The francophone portion of the provincial market had retreated to pre-nationalist days, and—at the Canadian national level—“quatre disques, dont ceux de Michael Jackson et de Culture Club, représentaient en 1984 à eux seuls 50% des ventes” (Alix 59). The government of Quebec stipulated 65% francophone programming on the radio, but many stations were able to circumvent this by creatively placing that content during hours of reduced listeners, like the middle of the night and early morning. At the same time, government ministries hatched a plan to combat the Americans using American standards: “Le Ministre des Affaires culturelles, de concert avec le ministère de l’Industrie et du Commerce, avait conçu un plan de ‘rattrapage’ de l’industrie québécoise de la musique qui consistait à la rentabiliser et à l’adapter aux normes et au fonctionnement de l’industrie américaine” (Alix 61). With this initiative, the government explicitly moved the Quebec music industry from an internal majority position to one of a distinct minority in the global anglophone music industry.

Camille Broussard offers an economic definition of cultural imperialism which applies here: “Du point de vue minoritaire, l’impérialisme culturel se définit...par la structuration préalable de l’espace des prix et des revenus” (45). In short, the “freedom” of the free market is highly conditioned by the distribution of wealth and productive capacity. This “structuring” of the marketplace is accomplished through several factors. In certain cases, prices can be determined by the wealth of the consumer. Put simply: items preferred by
the rich cost more because the rich can afford it. This is essentially the reason why a Picasso will always cost more at auction than an African or Asian painting of equivalent quality. Does this really matter in terms of a national cultural dynamic? Almost certainly, in that not only the creators of cultural artifacts, but also the entire cultural industry (for painting, agents, galleries, museums, schools, frame shops etc) benefit from the increased value of the artifact. The associated cultural domain undergoes an overall increase in activity made possible by the wealth of the consuming individuals.

Market forces in the music industry operate on a different basis, however, given universalized prices within a mass market. The compact disc will not appreciate in value depending on consumer wealth, but the profit margin per disc will vary depending on the number of qualified consumers in the market (by ‘qualified’ I mean simply having a standard of living which allows for the occasional purchase of luxury items like CDs). This is not inevitable: minority markets exist where production is accomplished using a single microphone in a living room and musician friends who play for free, resulting in a very high profit margin per disc. This is not an industrial model, however; once one adopts the “normes et fonctionnement de l’industrie américaine,” the level of technology and technicians required, the cost of skilled union musicians, producers, graphic designers, etc, drive the production cost to a level comparable to that of pop and rock albums produced in Los Angeles, New York or London. The world-wide market for anglophone music, however, means that potential sales for any given single product are on a scale that a substantial success will finance dozens of failures, giving the producers a flexibility which cannot exist in smaller markets like Quebec or even the world francophone market.
Moreover, the anglophone market for cultural artifacts is expanding at a rate similar to that of the English-based Western business model: “Aujourd’hui on parle de mondialisation de l’économie, mais il faut bien comprendre que l’économique est toujours devancée par le culturel: la musique rock américaine est le premier produit qui s’exporte dans les pays nouvellement ouverts au capitalisme, suivie par le Coke, les cigarettes et les McDonalds ” (Chamberland 85).

So few artists can guarantee sales sufficient to cover the cost of American-style productions that government subsidies are inevitable. Diane Dufresne, for example, a singer who was successful at staging arena-style shows in the Montreal Forum (previously almost exclusively the locus of American rock concerts), received such a massive subsidy for a 1984 performance at the Olympic Stadium that both critics and public complained (Thérien 135). The number of productions is shrinking, as is the number of participants, including producers, session musicians, artists, concert promoters and so on. In the 1990s the producer Michel Bélanger seems to have his name on every other Quebec production; one could say the same for the musician Rick Haworth. The results vary, though most productions tend toward stylistic conservatism based on American models.10 Jean Leloup’s disc “L’amour est sans pitié” is relatively creative roots rock based in Montreal street life with mixed French and English lyrics. Daniel Bélanger’s “Les insomniaques s’amusent,” on the other hand, is absolutely generic mainstream pop/rock, almost completely free of any québécois cultural content. Both were subsidized by the Ministry of Culture of the government of Quebec. Another successful product of the same year, the Beau Dommage reunion album, was subsidized
by Spectra-Scène, the concert production company which completely dominates that portion of the music industry in Quebec, after a series of consolidations. To complete the cycle, Alain Simard of Spectre-Scène is president of Les Francofolies de Montréal, a francophone music festival begun and produced in tandem with the city of La Rochelle (France), supported by governments and heavily subsidized by...Hydro-Québec.

There is little question that the link between militant nationalism and la chanson is broken. Jean-Pierre Ferland now believes it was a mistake to begin with: “...on a donné une fausse valeur aux chansonniers. On a donné une couleur nationaliste à la chanson et c’est ce qui l’a tué” (Roy 1977 86). The question remaining is whether the music of Quebec constitutes a measurable contribution to a cultural identity significantly distinct from its anglophone surroundings. Alix is pessimistic: “Les éléments symboliques traditionnels de l’identité culturelle québécoise sont dans un processus d’éclatement, notre espace culturel est incertain. L’espace social des musiciens est culturellement et économiquement aléatoire” (57).

The parallels between culture and economy are strong, and likely at the root of the political failures of the separatist movement. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the potential actors in a separate Quebec to see themselves as being culturally, or economically distinct from their North American context. Smith predicts the difficulties which small, ethnically defined nations will undergo in our time: “There is a real danger that medium-sized, let alone small nation-states or state-nations, will simply become obsolete or be bypassed by the technological, military and economic transformations of
the late twentieth century.” This could happen to Quebec, without its having ever formally attained the status of nation-state. The benefits of integration in the larger economy can be extensive. Céline Dion, having sold twenty million English-language records since 1993, sees Quebec as little more than folklore. She had the following exchange in a 1997 interview with an American journalist:

Is there a Canadian sound, do you think? Or any regional Canadian sounds, like Nashville here or Motown?
Well, there are some French Canadian folk singers, with the really broad accent. Would you ever consider folk music?
No, I’m not really interested.
Do you think Quebec should be a separate country?
[Pauses, then says curtly] I’m not going to answer that.

(McNamara 8)

For some, like Dion, Quebec nationalism has become an irritant, a sentimental relic which they wish would go away. 11 For those who are still working toward a national goal, the ideals which seemed attainable during l’âge d’or of Quebec song now seem substantially less so. Those ideals included political independence, economic self-sufficiency, and a cultural and linguistic identity which would have been primarily self-defined. As we have illustrated, constructing viable economic and cultural enterprises in Quebec has meant negotiating with the anglophone entities which both surround and penetrate the québécois ethnic spaces. In the economy this has meant a nationalized power company--Hydro-Québec--managed by francophones and partially financed by Wall Street. In the music world, this has meant bilingual recordings subsidized by the Ministry of Culture to attain American standards of production. These examples are no doubt predictive of the direction that political nationalism will take in Quebec, whatever
the results of the referendum which again loomed in 1998 as this article was completed.

This nationalism will be more defined by realpolitik than the revolutionary zeal of the 1960s. It will be a creative synthesis born of the continuing energy and the acquired wisdom of the francophone national impulse in North America. Song in Quebec, though it no longer represents the inspirational force it contained during the nationalist renaissance, is nevertheless reflective of what a québécois national identity is coming to be.

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1. “In the West...territorial centralization and consolidation went hand in hand with a growing cultural standardization. [...] This is most obvious during the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution, where the state sponsored fêtes, processions, rallies, music, theatre, artistic and architectural projects, for the glorification of la patrie, liberty and equality” (Smith 133–134).
2. Camille Broussard outlines quite precisely the contradictory possibilities between Canadian and Quebec nationalisms: “Nous avons hérité de l’Etat du XIXe siècle et un tel état, conçu pour asseoir une nation, ne peut respecter aucune minorité culturelle. Il est donc normal—et c’est le cas un peu partout à travers le monde—that les minorités culturelles protestent et se révoltent. Supposons maintenant—puisque c’est en grande partie notre travail—that nous soyons assez ingénieux pour inventer un État qui respecte la dynamique culturelle de ses minorités. Alors si le Canada anglais accepte cette formule pour lui-même, les Québécois francophones sont pour ainsi dire indifférents entre cette formule et l’indépendance puisque, cette dernière échelant, ils devront aussi respecter leurs propres minorités. Supposons le contraire. Alors les Québécois devront se résigner à l’indépendance ou à leur disparition en tant que groupe culturel” (43).
3. “During the Thirties, the Church and a small elite of lay people trained by the clergy and directly under their influence controlled almost every non-economic aspect of French-Canadian social and cultural life” (Milner and Milner 108).
This past association between Quebec nationalism and the least savory aspects of national socialism is one of the causes of the skepticism of commentators like Mordecai Richler with respect to the desirability of an ethnically defined independent francophone state. Richler cites Stephen Scheinberg of B’nai B’rith: “[Quebec] nationalism, having been historically interwoven with anti-Semitism and when combined with a poor economy, is a cause for concern” (254).

Hamelin and Provencher describe a radical change in social organization: “En dix ans, la société québécoise s’est déconfessionalisée et décléricalisée. Finie la belle unanimité autour de l’idéal évangélique. L’heure est à la dislocation, à la désertion. Les paroisses ne forment plus de communautés homogènes. Les syndicats et les coopératives achèvent de rompre leurs attaches religieuses. Par centaines, clercs et religieux retournent à l’état laïc” (113).

Francophone governments in Quebec had already forced pluralism on English institutions, which the English were able to accept. The language legislation had the effect on immigrant communities of negating their previous efforts entirely: “Just at the point where ethnic groups felt they were making headway with the English, the French decided to force the immigrants to join their community. To their dismay, the ethnic groups saw that they would have to start over and retrace with the French the painful steps they had taken with the English: first social exclusion, then adaptation, and finally an acceptance which was often based upon opportunism and condescension” (Arnopoulos 146).

“In this sparsely settled country [Canada], with its harsh climate and its high costs, social goals have often had to be sacrificed to greater productivity and efficiency. Even the
sense of nationhood has had to be played down in order to allow a free hand to foreign
capital and technology, which were expected to bring greater material well-being. Indeed,
there are few industrialized countries in the world today with such minimal control over
their resources, economic institutions, and economic development as has Canada. As a
means of promoting its own growth, Canada has consistently sought to preserve a semi-
colonial relationship, first with Britain through imperial preference, and then with the
United States through various modes of continentalism” (Arnopoulous and Clift 195).

8. “...le Québec réussit particulièrement bien l’intégration de la texture musicale et
instrumentale anglophone à la ‘parlure’ francophone. En tout cas, bien avant que la France
puisse en faire autant avec le français d’usage international” (Aubé 72).

9. Michael Ignatieff describes the consequences of existing and planned developments by
Hydro-Québec: “The costs of development in the [northern] region are astronomically
high—$12 to 15 billion. Already something like 40 percent of every consumer’s electric
bill is spent servicing Hydro-Québec’s debt for existing projects. Cheap power, Quebec
says, is the core of its competitive advantage in the North American economy, and its
electricity rates are among the lowest in North America. But they are cheap only if the
debt load of development in the north is kept out of the equation. If the new projects go
ahead, the debt load will become crippling, and if energy-efficiency measures cause
demand to drop, that load could become catastrophic. In other words, national
development is pressing up against the very limits, not merely of the Crees’ environment,
but of the carrying power of the Quebec nation, too” (166).
10. Nathalie Petrowski, in an 1982 article in *Le Devoir* (a major daily newspaper), described the state of the Quebec music in acid terms: “…la musique au Québec, ces jours-ci, est au point mort, complice servile d’un coma culturel qu’elle entretient et contre lequel elle n’a même plus la force ni le courage de se révolter. Complètement assimilée par le moule américain et son idéologie industrielle, elle se veut aujourd’hui propre, professionnelle, impersonnelle, ‘slick’ et chromée à la Diane Tell, musak pour une société de centre d’achats qui sommeille” (Roy 1985 136).

11. This is especially true in international corporate circles, as Milner and Milner ironically point out: “Since foreign investment and foreign control are obviously good things, people who object to them must have psychological problems. What is required is educational therapy to cleanse out ‘narrow nationalist prejudices,’ replacing them with noble and suitable sentiments of internationalism and broadmindedness” (89).